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RECENT CASES
interference with a relational interest enjoyed by the child. If the courts
can be convinced that distinctions amounting to more than mere words do
exist between the child's action for the enticement of his parent from the
family home and the spouse's action for alienation of affections, the legislative
policy of the heart-balm acts would not seem to be a compelling reason for
denying the child's action.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
PROPRIETY OF A STAY IN FEDERAL COURT WHEN COMPANION STATE
COURT SUIT RUNS CONCURRENTLY
Beginning in June, 1947, nine derivative stockholders' suits on behalf of
San-Nap-Pak, Inc., alleging raids upon the corporate treasury by its directors
and others, were successively filed in the New York State Supreme Court.
Later that year the New York court consolidated the nine actions into one.
In June, 1948, Mottolese brought an identical derivative action' in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, basing jurisdic-
tion on diversity of citizenship. The defendants moved in the federal court to
stay the federal suit. Judge Samuel Kaufman granted the motion but without
prejudice to an application for a modification or vacation of the stay if
circumstances so warranted. Decision on a motion by defendant to prevent
Mottolese from taking depositions under the liberal federal discovery pro-
cedure was held in abeyance. The Court indicated that it would not permit
the use of discovery in the federal courts if defendants acquiesced in per-
mitting examinations of equal scope in the state court. Mottolese petitioned
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for a writ of mandamus to
compel judge Kaufman to vacate the stay. The Court of Appeals, speaking
through Chief Judge Learned Hand, denied the petition, on the ground that
since the liberal examination before trial procedure was available to the
plaintiffs in the state court by reason of the District Court's action, the possi-
ble remaining advantages which might accrue to plaintiff from a continuation
of the action in the federal court did not outweigh the disadvantage to
defendants of defending two simultaneous actions on the same claims.
Mottolese v. Kaufant, 176 F. 2d 301 (2nd Cir. 1949).
When two simultaneous suits brought in different courts involve sub-
stantially identical parties or interests and substantially the same issues,2 a
pragmatic approach would require that only one proceed to final judgment.
Such multiplicity of suits within a single jurisdiction can be readily remedied
1. The complaint in the state court set forth ten causes of action against the de-
fendants; the Mottolese complaint stated nine. More defendants were served in the
Mottolese action, although two less were named.
2. The issues should be enough alike so that decision in one suit decides the issues of
the other. Cf. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248 (1936).
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by equitable relief in the form of a stay8 or bill of peace 4 -eliminating one
suit or the other. But where more than one jurisdiction is involved, principles
of sovereignty have prevented interjurisdictional recognition of the other
action.5
Where an action is brought in a federal court and another, on the same
issues and between the same parties, in a state tribunal, the unqualified grant
of jurisdiction to federal courts in the diversity statutes" was at first in-
terpreted by federal courts to mean that once the litigant showed adequate
grounds to get into federal court, his right to proceed to judgment was
absolute.' Thus, even though an identical action was moving to judgment
in a state court at the same time, the plaintiff was held to be entitled to a
federal adjudication.8 The result was friction between the state and federal
3. Ibid. The procedure of a stay might be said to permit a party's action to continue
after the stay order, for judgment may subsequently be entered in the case, but that judg-
ment will be based on principles of res judicata. Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission,
281 U. S. 470 (1930) ; 1 GAVIT, INDIANA PLEADING & PRACTICE § 128 (1941) ; see Scott,
Collateral Estoppel By Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942).
4. See Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 542 (1892). Burdick v. Burdick, 148 Wash.
15, 267 Pac. 767 (1928) ; see also Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co., Ltd. v. Boise
City, 213 U. S. 276, 286 (1909) ; 1 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, Section IV, espe-
cially § 254 (5th ed. 1941).
5. Chief Judge Learned Hand's opinion apparently points to elimination of this inter-
jurisdictional multiplicity of suits in federal and state courts, "Equity has always inter-
fered to prevent multiplicity of suits, and the same considerations which persuaded the
state to consolidate the nine actions there pending, make equally desirable a course as
near that as the law permits." Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 303 (2nd Cir. 1949).
6. The present statute is representative as to this, ". . . (a) The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions . . . between:
(1) citizens of different states .. .," 28 U. S. C. §§ 1332, 1359 (1948).
7. In McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268 (1910), Mr. Justice Day, at 282, stated,
.an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter
in the Federal court having jurisdiction over such controversies, and when they arise
between citizens of different states the Federal jurisdiction may be invoked, and the
cause carried to judgment, notwithstanding a state court may also have taken jurisdiction
of the same case." See Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Company, 212 U. S. 19, 40 (1909) ;
Huntington v. Laidley, 176 U. S. 668 (1900) ; Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529,
533 (1893); Krause Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc., 62 F.2d 1004 (2nd
Cir. 1933); City of Ironton v. Harrison Construction Co., 212 Fed. 353 (6th Cir. 1914).
This general rule was followed almost without exception in derivative cases. Ratner v.
Paramount Pictures, 46 F. Supp. 339 (S. D. N. Y. 1942) ; Consumers' Gas Co. v. Quinby,
137 Fed. 882 (8th Cir. 1905), cert. denied, 198 U. S. 585 (1905). Cf. Brendle v. Smith,
46 F. Supp. 522 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
8. That the federal action severely affected a state court function was not a bar in
itself to the right to federal trial. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, in Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 336 (1943). Later, however, exceptions were made allowing
a federal court to dismiss even though the cases preceded a possible state action where
the state had a policy of regulation, as in oil well drilling, Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U. S. 315 (1943) ; where state tax collections or assessments were interfered with by the
federal action, Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943) ;
where state court interpretation of a state statute had not been made and it was chal-
lenged in federal court on constitutional grounds, Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Pullman
Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941) ; where a state had set up its own system of liquidation of in-
solvent banks and building and loan associations, Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S.
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courts, a duplication of judicial work, and a waste of litigants' time and
money. As a consequence a few exceptions were whittled out of the absolute
right to federal decision.9 The moving considerations behind these relaxations
were an acceding to comity with state courts and a recognition of the possible
ineffectiveness of the final federal remedy granted.10
Until the Mottolese opinion the propriety of ordering a stay was predi-
cated on the possibility of fitting the case into one of two exceptions: in rem
cases, and cases where a declaratory judgment was sought." Mottolese can be
treated either as having added a new exception in cases of derivative suits or
as having swept away the few narrow exceptions to the absolute rule and
substituting in all concurrency cases a broad doctrine of weighing considera-
tions to determine whether the suit in the federal court ought to proceed to
trial.'2  It would appear that the latter was intended, for the majority treated
176 (1935) ; where state administrative procedure had not been exhausted, Prentis v. Atl.
Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908). Cf. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228
(1943), where it was said that even though a state law was difficult to determine, the
federal court must interpret it. See note, 25 IND. L. J. 316 (1950), discussing when a federal
court should refuse to proceed to judgment where the application of a federal statute or
necessity for determining a constitutional question depends on interpretation of un-
settled issues of state law.
Distinguish from the above the concurrency problem between state and federal court
suits where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity discussed here.
9. The earliest exception related to actions in rem: The court first assuming juris-
diction maintained it to the exclusion of the other. Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. S.
36 (1928) ; Butler v. Judge of the District Court, 116 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1941). See
Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 229 (1922). Later a second exception
crystallized where the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment in a federal court. The
suit would be dismissed or stayed if a concurrent state suit were deciding the same issues
for the same parties. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U. S. 491 (1942).
Contra: Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 157 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1946) ; Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Martin, 108 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1940) (where federal suits were filed first).
Mr. Justice Cardozo, in Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248 (1936), laid
down strict rules for discretionary granting of stays. There the concurrency was be-
tween two federal court suits. It is submitted in addition that neither the direct holding
there nor contemporaneous cases fully supported his test.
It must be remembered that the stays discussed in this note refer only to a federal
court's stay of its own action, not of the enjoining of another action in a state court. For
example where a federal court has decided an issue, it will not allow relitigation of that
issue in the state courts. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356 (1921) ;
Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 200 U. S. 273 (1906); 28 U. S. C. § 2283 (1948). For
a discussion of both types of stay in relation to federal courts, see MOORE'S COMMENTARY
ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 395-417 (1949).
10. As, for example, it was recognized that two courts could not simultaneously con-
trol property in curtodia legis and assure the successful party of the benefits of his judg-
ment. See note 9 supra.
11. See note 9 supra.
12. The question arises, "Does the Mottolese reasoning include in rein cases ?" The
answer is that one of the bases for the doctrine is a possible ineffectiveness of a final
federal remedy. This beyond doubt has been, under the old exception idea, and will con-
tinue to be under Mottolese a valid reason for not allowing two in rem suits, state and
federal, to proceed concurrently.
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the problem not as relating solely to derivative suits but as a general one of
multiplicity of suits.13
The considerations to be weighed when the suits are of a derivative
nature include those found in other types of concurrency cases as well as
considerations which pertain only to derivative actions. Ordinarily the
element most compelling toward grant or denial of a stay is priority in com-
mencing the action.14 Other considerations being equal, the first choice
of forum should control. If a federal court were to grant a stay merely upon
the pleading of a concurrent state action though filed after a federal suit or
issue one conditionally upon the bringing of a state action, the statutory grant
of diversity jurisdiction would be effectively nullified. Possibly the second
most important consideration is the comparative advantages of the procedure
in the two courts. The companion case to Mottolese in the state court illu-
strates some serious defects of antiquated state procedure, defects which
form an effective shield for the real defendants. One of these is the avail-
ability of delaying tactics, such as interlocutory appeals.'" Another is inade-
quate state deposition and discovery procedure. 6 Both of these factors should
13. See Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301-303 (2nd Cir. 1949). Chief Judge
Learned Hand's test which ". . . calls for the exercise of judgment which must weigh
competing interests and maintain an even balance," would seem to be unduly narrowed
in meaning if the stricter possible interpretation were accepted. Further, Judge Jerome
Frank's dissent characterized Mottolese as meaning that ". . . merely the inconvenience
to defendants of defending two actions, one in a federal and one in a state court in the
same city, suffices to justify staying the federal action, unless plaintiff shows that that
inconvenience to the defendants is outweighed by disadvantages to him." In his view
the Mottolese "decision goes a long way towards wiping out a substantial part of the
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the federal courts." Id. at 305.
14. Thus the federal court in Mottolese recognized that "... a federal suit, which
has been brought after a state suit, may be stayed . . ." (emphasis added). This priority
is the controlling factor in the in rem cases. Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 36
(1928). It also appears to be given great weight when the federal suit is for a declaratory
judgment. Compare Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U. S. 491 (1942), with
Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 157 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1946).
Fraudulent or unethical delay should be taken into account to determine which court
first has control or would have had control first had all dealings with the courts been
bona fides. Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36 (1928). It would seem, however, that a
small differential in time should carry little weight in ruling on a stay. (In many in-
stances attorneys for stockholders file in state and federal courts almost simultaneously.)
In such a situation the fact that one suit or the other was actually under way at the time
the stay was applied for should then become persuasive.
15. Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 308 (2nd Cir. 1949) ; see Hornstein, Legal
Controls for Intracorporate Abuse, 41 COL. L. REV. 405, 416-422 (1941). For a con-
vincing picture of the dilatory character of such appeals, see the Annotations to §§ 588,
589 and 609 of the N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT.
16. Compare RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS. Rules
26-37 with N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 288; see Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 308
(2nd Cir. 1949). Judge Frank forcefully characterized the New York deposition pro-
cedure in the following manner, ". . . under Federal Rules the deponent may be ex-
amined regarding any matter 'relevant to the subject involved in the pending action,' a
phrase which has not received any restrictive interpretation similar to those given by the
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weigh in favor of continuing the federal action. Although nothing was done
about the interlocutory appeal situation, 1 7 Mottolese remedied the problem
of inadequate state discovery procedure by making the stay of the federal
action conditional upon the voluntary submission by the defendants in the
state action to federal discovery rules.:'
In derivative suits another factor need be weighed. Rule 23 (c) of the
Rules of Civil Procedure for United States District Courts requires notice
to all stockholders before a settlement is approved and is an impelling induce-
ment to continue federal trial.'9 As more derivative suits end in judicially
approved settlements than in judgments on the merits,20 the importance of
such a rule to the protection of non-party stockholder interests against secret
settlements becomes evident. Aside from Rule 2 3(c) a federal derivative
suit offers an additional benefit, for the net recovery to the stockholder
interests will be greater due to the federal strictness in allowance of attorneys'
fees." '
One more facet to be considered when determining which of several
derivative suits should continue is the amount of interest represented in the
respective suits. 22  Naturally where a greater stock interest is formally
represented as plaintiffs any settlement will prove to be satisfactory to more
stockholders and the chances that the suit is of the so-called "strike"2' variety
New York courts to the word 'necessary.' In a suit like this, where it is likely that none
of the relevant facts are within the personal knowledge of the stockholder plaintiffs, full
examination before trial is vital."
17. It would not seem objectionable to make the federal stay conditional upon the
non-exercise by defendants of their state interlocutory appeal rights: forcing them to
save those questions for presentation to the state appellate court after final judgment
below on all issues.
The general rule is that failure to appeal from an interlocutory order is not prejudicial
to a subsequent raising of the question, which would have been the basis of the inter-
locutory appeal, after a final judgment beloy. 2 GAvIT, INDIANA PLEADING & PRACTICE
8 508, p. 2507 (1941).
18. See Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 309 (2nd Cir. 1949) (dissent) ; Bachrach
v. General Investment Corp., 31 F. Supp. 84, 86 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
19. While a number of state courts have voluntarily adopted such procedure, no state
statutes compel such action. See Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholder Derivatve
Suits, 47 COL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1947).
20. Id. at 15-30.
21. See Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 32 CALIF. L.
Rrv. 123, 135 (1944), and Iornstein, New Aspects of Stockholder Derivative Suits, 47
COL. L. Pxv. 1, 11-13, 16-17, 27 (1947). Large attorneys' fees, contingent in most
derivative actions, are not necessarily excessive. See Winkelman v. General Motors Corp.,
48 F. Supp. 504 (S. D. N. Y. 1942); Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholders'
Derivative Suits, 39 COL. L. REv. 784 (1939).
22. Possibly a corollary consideration is that state trial may be more desirable be-
cause certain defendants may be kept out of the federal action because of their non-
diverse citizenships.
23. State statutes have recently been passed to remedy the supposed evil of "strike"
suits. See, e.g., NEw YORK GENERAL CORP. LAW § 61-b; N. J. STAT. ANN. (1946 Supp.)
Title 14, 88 3-15 added by N. J. L. 1945, c. 131; WIs. STAT. (1947) § 180.13 added by
L. 1945, c. 462. But see Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
will be smaller. Within a jurisdiction consolidation and intervention are
means of attaining the greatest representation of interest. But consolidation
is unavailable as between state and federal courts. Thus the federal court
must determine and weigh the liberality of the rules of intervention in the
respective jurisdictions and the status of represented interest in each to
determine which suit will in the future represent the greatest possible amount
of stock interest.
2 4
Little argument need be made that suits should be consummated as
quickly as possible, for delay may lead to mounting costs and unavailability
of witnesses and evidence.2 : In an attempt to secure this goal the diligence26
of respective counsel, adequacy of procedure, and a comparison of calendar
conditions27 in each court should be of some weight in determining the advis-
ability of staying the federal action. Perhaps still another consideration is
in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944) ; Wolfson, Striking out "strike suits," For-
tune, March, 1949, p. 137. Their requirements were formerly termed procedure by a ma-
jority of lower federal courts. Boyd v. Bell, 64 F. Supp. 22 (S. D. N. Y. 1945). Thus,
they were held inapplicable in federal courts under the Erie rule. Since these statutes
made it difficult to bring derivative suits in state courts, they formed a basis for forcing
derivative suits into the federal courts where alone they could be prosecuted. But after
argument and before decision in Mottolese, the Supreme Court, in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), declared such statutory requirements ap-
plicable in federal courts. One of the grounds and probably the real reason for Mottolese's
struggle for a federal court trial was lost.
24. Compare the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS,
Rule 24 with IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1946) § 2-222. See N. Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT
§ 193(3) : Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 42 COL.
L. REV. 574, 575-582 (1942).
25. See Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting, in Koster v. Lumberman's Mutual Ins. Co., 330
U. S. 518, 533, 536 (1947) ; Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholders' Derivative
Suits, 39 COL. L. REV. 784, 793 "(1939) ; Wolfson, Striking out "strike suits," Fortune,
March, 1949, pp. 137, 138.
26. But what if a stay has been granted in federal court and issues are improperly
handled in the state trial to the point of material damage to the stockholders' claims? In
such a situation it may be necessary, when the federal stay is lifted and trial in federal
court resumes, to use an analogous solution to that found in Winkelman v. General Motors
Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960, 1020-1021 (S. D. N. Y. 1942), where the two trials ran con-
currently and the state court reached decision first. The rule ordinarily is that where
issues were litigated in good faith or could have been litigated, the judgment deciding the
claims in which those issues are involved makes those issues res judicata. 1 GAVIT, INDI-
ANA PLEADING & PRACTICES §§ 176, 177 (1941). But in the Winkelinan case the federal
court declined to regard as res judicata a decision in the state court granting a motion for
summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the motion having been unopposed and the
state court not having been informed that an action involving substantially the same mat-
ters was pending in the federal courts.
27. See Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 303 (2nd Cir. 1949). Chief Judge
Learned Hand's statement, "Indeed, we take judicial notice of the fact that the non-jury
docket in the Southern District of New York is in the neighborhood of eleven months in
arrears," is elusive, for it gives no comparison to the state of the calendar in the state
court. What of the fact that at the time the petition was submitted to the Second Circuit
in the principle case of the suits pending only Mottolese was on trial calendar and only in
Mottolese had discovery proceedings been instituted? See Brief for Petitioner, p. 3,
Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2nd Cir. 1949).
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the presence of fraudulent or unfair practices in the state court or impending
unfair settlement there-either of. these in itself would be adequate reason
for lifting or denying a stay of the federal action.2"
The regulatory nature29 of a derivative suit demands that all these con-
siderations be weighed in order to assure stockholder plaintiffs of quick,
efficient decision on their claims. The Mottolese doctrine of weighing
competing interests results in placing the corporate derivative suit in the
most effective jurisdiction, and not forcing defendants unnecessarily to
defend multiple simultaneous actions on the same claims.80 The question
then becomes, how many of the considerations present when the suits are
derivative apply in order to effectuate the Mottolese doctrine when the suits
are non-derivative? The peculiar nature of the derivative suit provides the
answer. Because it is a device of equity to prevent failure of fiduciary
performance by management and is motivated by nominal plaintiffs, the
duty to protect the real plaintiff, the corporation, falls upon the courts.81
Where there are concurrent derivative suits, the real plaintiff, the corporation,
has been unable to choose which forum should be used and the court must
therefore decide. It can readily be seen that the latter disability does not
inhere in ordinary non-class suits. In this latter category, at the very outset
the plaintiff in a diversity case being in control of his own suit has the choice
of what he considers the best forum, either state or federal. 32  As contrasted
with the derivative suit, in which another member of the class in protecting
28. Additional criteria for ruling on a stay, beyond those listed above, exist when
the federal and state suits are in different states. Documents or witnesses may be beyond
the jurisdictional power of a court. The enforceability of a judgment may only be
possible by a successful plaintiff bringing a subsequent suit in another jurisdiction on
the judgment rendered.
The precedents for stay or dismissal in this type of situation are clearer, for the
doctrine of formn non conveniens may be applied. Koster v. Lumberman's Mutual Ins.
Co., 330 U. S. 518 (1946), 23 IND. L. J. 82 (1947). Cf. 28 U. S. C. §§ 1401, 1404 (1948).
29. Koessler, The Stockholders Suit: A Comparative View, 46 COL. L. REV. 238
(1946); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 149 (rev. ed. 1946).
30. An indication that state courts may adopt this doctrine as to derivative suits is
evidenced by Milvey v. Sperry Corp., 36 N. Y. S.2d 881 (1939), and even perhaps as to
non-derivative suits. In re Phelen, 225 Wis. 314, 274 N. W. 411 (1937).
31. The real plaintiff is that fictional being called the "corporation." If those
responsible for the conduct of its affairs would sue for a remedy, one might with more
reason say that it had a choice of forum (if the principle wrongdoers were citizens of
another state). However, when the corporation, through its officers, will not sue, with
the consequence that stockholders may press the claims for it, there is no central in-
terested authority directing where they will seek trial, and even though they are only
nominal, their citizenships may or may not give them a choice of forum. The forum
which is chosen may be less convenient and efficient than another court entertaining a
contemporaneous, parallel suit. With such a situation existing courts should act to
maintain the central purpose of the derivative suit: To secure all stockholder interest a
quick, efficient recovery upon causes of action.
32. Of course, defendant has a choice of removing or not when the original action
is brought in a state court.
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his own interest is also forced to sue in behalf of the corporation, the plaintiff
in a non-class suit resues in another jurisdiction usually because he fears
that he will lose the original action which he has instituted. 33 There is no
need for regulation and the plaintiff should be bound by his first choice.
Therefore the fact that the first forum chosen should control leads to the
conclusion that time is the only pertinent criterion applicable in a non-
derivative suit.
The propriety of diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts, the need
for which has never satisfactorily been disproved,34 is admittedly a question
for Congress.33 That body has repeatedly reenacted the oft criticized statute
giving federal courts such jurisdiction.36 But the fact that Congress has
exercised its constitutional choice by giving federal courts diversity jurisdic-
tion is not a basis for ruling that one has the right to proceed to judgment in
federal court on a mere showing that this jurisdiction exists.37  Perhaps taking
such a position was a belligerent attempt to strike back at states adopting
an uncooperative attitude. Today such hostilities are almost at an end. Even
those most jealous of protecting diversity jurisdiction must realize that this
slight destruction of that jurisdiction is more than compensated for by the
fact that the Mottolese doctrine will further comity with state courts, expedite
the remedy for the stockholder plaintiff, and cut down useless multiple litiga-
tion by non-stockholder plaintiffs.
33. See Kline v. Burke Construction Company, 260 U. S. 226 (1922), and Landis v.
North American Company, 299 U. S. 248 (1936). If the first suit is in federal court, a
party can keep a new suit in the state court by joining parties whose citizenship will
eliminate complete diversity and conversely if the old suit is in a state court, a new suit
can be brought in federal court if parties whose citizenships cause lack of complete diver-
sity are not named (or perhaps the first suit could have been removed or brought
originally in federal court but simply was not through choice or for some reason was
not until it was too late to conform to the federal statutory requirements).
34. Compare Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United States and
States Courts, 13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 520 (1928) (criticising diversity jurisdiction), with
Yntema and Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 869, 887 (1931) (supporting diversity jurisdiction).
35. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S.
315, 336 (1943).
36. 1 STAT. 78 (1789) ; 18 STAT. 470 (1875); 24 STAT. 552 (1887); 36 STAT. 1091
(1911), 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1948); 54 STAT. 143 (1940), 28 U. S. C. § 1332(3)(b)
(1948) ; 62 STAT. 930, 935, 28 U. S. C. § 1332, 1359 (1948). But cf. recent restrictions
on diversity jurisdiction. 48 STAT. 775 (1934), 28 U. S. C. § 1341 (1948) (provision
against enjoining by federal courts of state tax assessments or collections) ; 50 STAT.
738 (1937), 28 U. S. C. § 1342 (1948) (provision against enjoining orders of state rate
making bodies by federal courts).
37. As pointed out in note 9 supra, there were a few exceptions to this absolute right.
